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A The Complete Model
The complete system of non-linear equations describing the equilibrium are given by
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with an associated equation describing the evolution of price dispersion, ∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−η
di,
which is not needed to tie down the equilibrium upon log-linearisation. The model is then closed
with the addition of a description of monetary policy, which will either be rule based, or derived
from various forms of optimal policy discussed in the main text.
In order to render this model stationary we need to scale certain variables by the non-
stationary level of technology, At such that kt = Kt/At whereKt = {Yt, Ct,Wt/Pt}. All other real
variables are naturally stationary. Applying this scaling, the steady-state equilibrium conditions
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reduce to:
NϕXσ = w(1− τ)
1 = βRπ−1/γ = βr/γ
y = N = c
X = c(1− θ)
η
η − 1
=
1
w
.
This system yields
Nσ+ϕ (1− θ)σ = w(1− τ). (1)
which can be solved for N . Note that this expression depends on the real wage w, which can
be obtained from the steady-state pricing decision of our monopolistically competitive firms. In
Appendix B we contrast this with the labour allocation that would be chosen by a social planner in
order to fix the steady-state tax rate required to offset the net distortion implied by monopolistic
competition and the consumption habits externality.
B The Social Planner’s Problem
The subsidy level that ensures an efficient long-run equilibrium is obtained by comparing the
steady state solution of the social planner’s problem with the steady state obtained in the decen-
tralised equilibrium. The social planner ignores the nominal inertia and all other inefficiencies
and chooses real allocations that maximise the representative consumer’s utility subject to the
aggregate resource constraint, the aggregate production function, and the law of motion for habit-
adjusted consumption:
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The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate of substi-
tution between labour and habit-adjusted consumption and the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution in habit-adjusted consumption
(N∗t )
ϕ (X∗t )
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)−σ
.
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The steady state equivalent of this expression can be written as
(N∗)ϕ+σ (1− θ)σ = (1− θβ) .
If we contrast this with the allocation achieved in the steady-state of our decentralised equi-
librium given by equation (1), we can see that the two will be identical whenever the tax rate is
set optimally to be
τ∗ ≡ 1−
η
η − 1
(1− θβ).
Notice that in the absence of habits the optimal tax rate would be negative, such that it is
effectively a subsidy which offsets the monopolistic competition distortion. However, for the
estimated values of the habits parameter the optimal tax rate is positive as the policy maker
wishes to prevent households from overconsuming.
C Derivation of Objective Function
Individual utility in period t is
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)
where Xt = ct − θct−1 is habit-adjusted aggregate consumption after adjusting consumption for
the level of productivity, ct = Ct/At.
Linearisation up to second order yields
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where where tip(3) includes terms independent of policy as well as terms of third order and higher.
For every variable Zt with steady state value Z we denote Ẑt = log(Zt/Z).
The second order approximation to the production function yields the exact relationship
Nˆt = ∆ˆt + yˆt , where yt = Yt/At and ∆t =
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The second order approximation to the national income identity yields
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Finally, we use that in the efficient steady-state X
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After normalising the coefficient on inflation to one, we can write the microfounded objective
function as,
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where the weights on the two real terms are functions of model structural parameters, where
Φ1 =
σ(1−θ)
1−θβ
(1−βα)(1−α)
αη and Φ2 =
ϕ(1−βα)(1−α)
αη .
D A Bayesian Learning Rate Indicator
This section applies the Bayesian learning rate indicator proposed by Koop et al. (2013) to check
the degree of parameter identification under discretion, commitment, and the simple rule with
Markov switching rule parameters in Table 2. This indicator does not propose a ‘Yes/No’ answer
to the question of whether a given parameter is identified. However, it indicates the degree of
identification. This indicator is developed on the basis of Bayesian asymptotic theory. As sample
size increases, the role of the prior vanishes and the posterior of the parameter asymptotically
converges to its true value.
The advantage of this indicator is that it can be easily applied to models with Markov-
switching parameters, since it requires only a few additional steps during an ordinary Bayesian
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estimation. However, applying this indicator requires prior knowledge that a subset of model
parameters is known to be identifiable. Therefore, we rely on results obtained using Iskrev (2010)
that the fixed parameter versions of our model closed with either a simple rule or optimal policy
are identifiable.
In developing this indicator Koop et al. (2013) assume Gaussian priors to obtain analytical
solution of posterior precision when the sample period reaches infinity. However, for most DSGE
models, the priors are non-Gaussian. Therefore, the exact expression of posterior precision is
different from those illustrated in Koop et al. (2013). In applying this indicator to a DSGE
model, Caglar et al. (2011) suggest treating the Hessian at the posterior mode as the measure
of posterior precision. The technical details of this indicator can be found in Koop et al. (2013).
Here, we focus on how this indicator is applied to our Markov switching models.
Let θ = [θi, θu]
′ be a vector of model parameters, with the assumption that θi is known to
be identified, while the identification of θu is under question. Prior to applying the Bayesian
learning rate indicator, we use Iskrev (2010) to determine how we split the model parameters
into θi and θu. θu includes parameters that are associated with Markov switching in policy, shock
variances and parameters in the transition matrix. These parameters cannot be incorporated in
the Iskrev (2010) test. For both commitment and discretion θu = [p11, p22, q11, q22, σξ(s=1,2),
σµ(s=1,2), σz(s=1,2), ωπ(S=2)], while for the simple rule with Markov-switching rule parameters θu
= [p11, p22, q11, q22, σξ(s=1,2), σµ(s=1,2), σz(s=1,2), σR(s=1,2), ψ1(S=1,2), ψ2(S=1,2), ρ
R
(S=1,2)].
1
To implement this indicator, we simulate samples of artificial data from each models. Models
with Markov-switching parameters complicate the data generating processes (DGPs). To simulate
data from a Markov-switching model, we need to set the model parameters and the probabilities
of each regime. We set model parameters equal to posterior means in Table 2. Unlike when
using a fixed parameter model to generate datasets as discussed in Koop et al. (2013) and Caglar
et al. (2011), we cannot generate a single large dataset and then take subsets of it to produce
smaller samples. This is because probabilities of different sample sizes have to correspond to the
estimated transition probabilities (p11, p22, q11, q22).
We generate data samples with T = 100, 1000, 10000 and 20000. In order to ensure our
implementation of this indicator is as comparable as possible across models, we use the same seed
for the random number generator for DGPs in each case.
Tables D1, D2 and D3 present the normalised posterior precision of parameters included in θu
under discretion, commitment and a simple rule. As discussed in Koop et al. (2013), we observe
1We set ωπ(S=1) = 1, therefore ωπ(S=1) is not included in θu under optimal policy.
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that posterior precision need not rise monotonically with T. The posterior precision may, in fact,
fall before rising depending on prior type. However, Koop et al. (2013) show that the normalised
posterior precision of an unidentified parameter will shrink to zero very quickly as T increases.
To make our results robust, we double our sample size from T = 10000, the largest sample size
used in Koop et al. (2013) to T = 20000. It can be seen that none of the normalised posterior
precision in θu collapse to zero when T = 20000. This indicates that our model parameters are
reasonably well identified.
Table D1: Posterior precision divided by sample size (Discretion)
Parameters n = 100 n = 1000 n = 10000 n = 20000
Parameters associated with the MS mechanism
ωπ(S=2) 5.246 3.280 1.355 0.733
σξ(s=1) 2.022 3.584 2.938 2.778
σξ(s=2) 2.969 0.959 1.628 1.505
σµ(s=1) 7.324 8.812 5.512 7.017
σµ(s=2) 4.447 1.151 1.768 1.815
σz(s=1) 7.628 8.525 4.567 8.475
σz(s=2) 4.480 1.210 1.704 1.645
p11 8.244 1.692 1.735 1.274
p22 35.245 11.901 3.209 1.804
q11 19.865 2.834 4.836 5.573
q22 12.903 15.956 10.427 11.448
Table D2: Posterior precision divided by sample size (Commitment)
Parameters n = 100 n = 1000 n = 10000 n = 20000
Parameters associated with the MS mechanism
ωπ(S=2) 8.262 4.963 4.195 2.766
σξ(s=1) 1.171 1.770 4.881 2.657
σξ(s=2) 3.405 1.184 0.857 0.817
σµ(s=1) 0.154 0.207 0.383 0.318
σµ(s=2) 0.506 0.226 0.251 0.152
σz(s=1) 2.969 12.158 11.467 9.317
σz(s=2) 4.175 2.602 3.618 2.113
p11 6.023 20.369 20.935 16.786
p22 15.055 14.846 8.503 5.381
q11 10.221 13.311 10.774 8.300
q22 2.451 12.749 14.382 12.000
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Table D3: Posterior precision divided by sample size (simple rule)
Parameters n = 100 n = 1000 n = 10000 n = 20000
Parameters associated with the MS mechanism
ρR(S=1) 27.191 30.109 29.181 29.731
ρR(S=2) 2.089 1.469 1.852 3.036
ψ1(S=1) 0.538 0.573 0.409 0.504
ψ1(S=2) 0.717 1.558 1.764 1.777
ψ2(S=1) 2.042 0.605 0.237 0.258
ψ2(S=2) 2.636 0.697 0.304 0.327
σR(s=1) 48.769 63.814 70.160 67.808
σR(s=2) 6.584 6.019 4.348 5.173
σξ(s=1) 1.518 1.967 2.483 2.380
σξ(s=2) 1.007 0.907 0.776 0.703
σµ(s=1) 1.025 0.238 0.015 0.016
σµ(s=2) 0.286 0.041 0.006 0.008
σz(s=1) 9.299 8.299 9.649 10.309
σz(s=2) 1.035 1.019 0.761 1.047
p11 36.516 21.990 11.710 15.341
p22 5.293 3.395 3.785 4.816
q11 8.116 9.110 11.263 11.229
q22 3.379 2.246 1.762 2.015
E Implicit Interest Rate Rule
This section outlines how, in principle, we can construct an interest rate rule underpinning dis-
cretion, and estimates that rule without imposing the cross-equation restrictions implied by dis-
cretion.
There are numerous ways of representing the policy rules implied by discretion, which will
rarely be unique, even although the equilibrium implied by discretionary policy will be. To
consider potential functional forms of an instrument rule we employ the following Lagrangian
representation of the policy problem under discretion:
L =
1
2
 ω1
(
(1− θ)−1(ŷt − θŷt−1) + ξ̂t
)2
+ ω2
(
ŷt −
σ
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(
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2
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+ βEtVt+1
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−1(Etŷt+1 − θŷt)
+ 1σ
(
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)
+ (1− ρ)ξ̂t
]
+λ2t [π̂t − χfβEtπ̂t+1 − χbπ̂t−1 − κc(σ(1− θ)
−1(ŷt − θŷt−1) + ϕŷt + µ̂t)],
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where, due to the linear-quadratic nature of our policy problem, the expectations variables are a
linear function of the states which include π̂t and ŷt, while the value function, Vt, will be quadratic
in the states. The first order condition for R̂t is
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the first order condition for output ŷt is given by,
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ŷt −
σ
ϕ
ξ̂t
)
+λ1t
[
1 + θ
1− θ
−
1
1− θ
∂Etŷt+1
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and the first order condition for inflation, π̂t, is
ωπ,st π̂t + ωπ,st
ζα−1
(1− ζ)
(π̂t − π̂t−1)− λ
1
t
[
1
1− θ
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In principle, we could use the first order conditions for ŷt and π̂t to eliminate the LMs, λ
1
t and λ
2
t ,
from the first order condition for R̂t to get an implied instrument rule under discretion. However,
to write such an instrument rule is complicated and difficult to compare informatively with the
estimated simple rules.
Nevertheless, we can see that the implied instrument rule under discretion is a linear function
of the following arguments:
Rt = f(R̂t−1, π̂t, π̂t−1, ŷt, ŷt−1, ξ̂t, ẑt, µ̂t, ξ̂t−1, ẑt−1, µ̂t−1).
where the rule is a function of the contemporaneous values of all endogenous variables and all
states. However, one can manipulate this further, as in Clarida et al. (1999) by substitution of
either the IS curve or the NKPC, to show that the interest rate is a function of expected inflation
and output, current inflation and output and all states,
Rt = f(R̂t−1, Etπ̂t+1, π̂t, π̂t−1, Etŷt+1, ŷt, ŷt−1, ξ̂t, ẑt, µ̂t, ξ̂t−1, ẑt−1, µ̂t−1).
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Therefore, we proceed by estimating a very general interest rate rule containing all these
terms:
R̂t = ρ
R
stR̂t−1 + (1− ρ
R
st)
(
ψ1,st π̂t + ψ2,st ŷt + ψ3,st π̂t−1 + ψ4,st ŷt−1
+ψ5,stEtπ̂t+1 + ψ6,stEtŷt+1
)
+ψ7ẑt + ψ8µ̂t + ψ9ξ̂t + ψ10ẑt−1 + ψ11µ̂t−1 + ψ12ξ̂t−1 + ε
R
t ,
where we allow Markov-switching in parameters of lagged interest rates, expected, current and
lagged output and inflation, and we also allow the interest rate to directly respond shocks. Specifi-
cally, the priors of ρRst ,ψ1,st and ψ2,st are the same as we reported in Table 1 in the paper, while for
the priors of other parameters they are set to follow the normal distribution with wide standard
deviations.
We find that the likelihood at the mode of this general rule is superior to discretion, but it
is over-parameterised that discretion remains dominant in terms of marginal data density, which
is the correct criterion to compare different models within the Bayesian estimation framework.
Therefore, generalising the interest rate rule tends to improve the likelihood, but at the cost of
increasing model complexity.
Table E1 decomposes the marginal data density (which underpins the Bayes factor com-
parisons of model fit) into the likelihood at the mode and the penalty associated with over-
parameterisation. The results suggest that, in terms of likelihood, discretion marginally improves
upon a simple rule with switches in parameters, but that the latter is penalised due to the larger
number of parameters such that discretion is ‘decisively’ preferred to the simple rule in terms of
Bayes Factors.2 The rule with switches in the inflation target has fewer parameters and so faces
a milder penalty, but the underlying likelihood is less favourable which again accounts for the
relative success of discretion.
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